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Abstract. In this article, I discuss the importance of multidisciplinary research to tack-
le the questions that empirical sciences, and in particular neuroscience, ultimately 
encounter. The last decades have witnessed an enormous progress in brain research, 
mainly because of the improvement of neuroimaging techniques and neurogenetics, 
and the development of optogenetics. Furthermore, the US Government and European 
Union have launched the BRAIN Initiative and Human Brain Project, respectively, to pro-
mote a better understanding of brain functioning and its disorders. Unfortunately, their 
gates appear sealed for disciplines that pursue a deep knowledge of the mind, such as 
philosophy or psychology. The most probable outcome of this situation is “promissory 
materialism”, as Sir John Eccles warned several decades ago. I review the multidisci-
plinary approach of Eccles to the study of the brain and mind, especially through his 
relationship with Mariano Artigas. Finally, I propose that interdisciplinary research may 
be improved by a more solid understanding of the discipline one wants to dialogue 
with, and a multidisciplinary training from the beginning of the research career.
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Introduction: The decades of the brain
In 1990, July 17th, President George Bush designated the decade between 1990 
and 1999 as the “Decade of the brain”, “to enhance public awareness of the 
benefits to be derived from brain research”. In the Presidential Proclamation 
6158, Bush justifies this designation as the main way to alleviate neurological 
and psychiatric disorders, including addiction and genetic disorders, and 
leans on the spectacular advances in the field of microscopy, genetics and 
brain imaging (Bush 1990). This initiative was unquestionably a boost, 
both intellectual and economic, to promote research in neuroscience. The 
decade of 2000s also brought a high enthusiasm about what neuroscience 
was discovering or, more precisely, what would discover in the near future. 
For example, the prestigious magazine Scientific American highlighted the 
following advances in neuroscience during the decade after the “Decade of 
the brain” (Calderone 2014): 1) neurogenetics: the ability to diagnose neural 
disorders with a simple blood test; 2) brain mapping, at the level of functional 
and anatomical connections; 3) brain plasticity in adults; 4) grid cells in 
the hippocampus, also known as the “GPS” of the brain; 5) the interplay 
between memory and emotions; 6) the improvement of cognitive-behavior 
therapies for psychiatric disorders; 7) optogenetics, that is, the technique 
to introduce neurons sensitive to light in adult non-human animals; 8) the 
implication of glial cells in cognitive functions; 9) the development of neural 
implants; and 10) a better understanding of human decision making. But the 
great interest and advances in neuroscience did not stop a decade after the 
“Decade of the brain”. As it is well known, President Obama launched in 2013 
the BRAIN (Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnolo-
gies) Initiative, which in practice involves the investment of thousands of 
millions in advancing neuroscience. Almost simultaneously, the European’s 
Commission Future and Emerging Technologies Flagship announced the 
Human Brain Project, a multi-phase strategy “to put in place a cutting-edge, 
ICT-based scientific Research Infrastructure for brain research, cognitive 
neuroscience and brain-inspired computing”. In conclusion, neuroscience 
is experiencing a sweet moment for the last 30 years, developing new 
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techniques, discovering exciting findings, and promising great advances 
in the study of the brain and mind. But, is that so?
One would expect that such a strong effort to understand better the 
neural system would entail a commensurate attempt to go deeper in the 
study of the mind. However, this connection is not straightforward. The 
main reason of this apparent imbalance is the presupposition that the study 
of the brain equals the study of the mind. Steve Hyman, former president 
of the National Institutes of Mental Health and current president of the 
International Neuroethics Society, stated that “Mental illnesses are real, 
diagnosable, treatable brain disorders” (Hyman 1998). Psychologist Gregory 
Miller has denounced this and other examples of scientific reductionism. In 
his opinion, the main problem is that “the dominant discourse in modern 
cognitive, affective, and clinical neuroscience assumes that we know how 
psychology/biology causation works when we do not” (Miller 2010). Miller’s 
was a reaction to the main outcomes of Bush’s “Decade of the brain”. What 
can we expect about the study of the mind from the BRAIN Initiative and 
the Human Brain Project? At first sight, both seem somewhat discouraging 
at this respect. The former is explained in a 150-page document. Within it, 
the term “psychology” appears six times, but none as one of the fields where 
money will be invested in. “Mind”, apart from expressions such as “bearing in 
mind”, is present just once, in the preamble. “Philosophy”, similarly, appears 
once in one of the subheadings (“Vision and philosophy”). Apparently, any 
expert or layman would accept that the study of the brain and mind should 
go hand in hand, and neither of the terms should be reduced to the other. 
Furthermore, it seems clear that psychology and philosophy are adequate 
disciplines to enrich our understanding of the human mind. In my opinion, 
as I explain below, the core of the problem is to assume that even though 
neuroscience, psychology and philosophy have different methodologies, 
they all are adequate approaches to enrich our understanding of the brain 
and mind. Surprisingly, however, the efforts of the American and European 
titanic projects are restricted to just one of these disciplines. Are we going 
to have adequate answers about the mind —and even the brain— with such 
a partial view?
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1. Beyond the limits of neuroscience: The case of free will
As I mentioned above, psychologists and philosophers are getting used to 
be excluded from projects whose main goal is advancing in the knowledge 
of the brain. I believe that the communication breakdown between these 
approaches is worrying; furthermore, it is dramatic when one of them 
artificially maximizes its conclusions to phagocyte thousands of years of 
research in philosophy and psychology. This is the case of most interpre-
tations about the “neurobiology of free will”.
The unbiased demonstration of the inexistence of free will appears 
to be the ultimate goal of a materialist neuroscientist. According to the 
philosopher Susan Blackmore, “Many philosophers and scientists have 
argued that free will is an illusion. Unlike all of them, Benjamin Libet found 
a way to test it” (Blackmore 2007). I will not discuss Libet’s experiments in 
detail here, although a short overview could be useful for the reader. In an 
article published in 1983, Libet and collaborators introduced an experiment 
to explore consciousness in the initiation of a voluntary action (Libet et al. 
1983). Their strategy was to ask the volunteer to flex their wrist whenever 
he or she wanted, and record the precise time of the movement, as well 
as the onset of the readiness potential —the brain activity related to the 
movement of the hand. Additionally, subjects had to register the exact 
time at which they “felt the will” to move their hands. Their results showed 
that, in this temporal chain of events, the third was the wrist flexion, the 
second was the “conscious will to move”, and the first was the readiness 
potential. In other words, the “urge to start the movement” was a by-product 
of brain activity. While the original results might be used to demonstrate 
the inexistence of free will, Libet reported in subsequent experiments that, 
even though the readiness potential was already initiated, there would be 
a possibility to consciously veto the movement (Libet 1985). These results 
about the conscious veto have been recently replicated with sophisticated 
brain-computer interface techniques (Schultze-Kraft et al. 2015). Libet’s 
experiments are of great importance to inform about the brain correlates 
of movement preparation; however, as it has been extensively commented, 
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they are not about free will (see, for example, Bennett and Hacker 2003; 
Murillo and Giménez-Amaya 2008; Bernácer and Giménez-Amaya 2013). 
The main reason is that there is no “freedom” for the volunteers taking 
part in this experiment: after signing their informed consent, they have to 
be seated in the experimental room and move the hand when they are told 
to do it. The movement is truly self-initiated, but in a very narrow time 
frame —usually during the second cycle of the clock, that is, approximately 
between 2.5 and 5 s after starting the experiment.
In summary, many neuroscientists and some philosophers defend that 
free will is an illusion because the “conscious feeling to start a movement” 
is preceded by a consistent brain activity. This assertion entails a set of 
assumptions —for example: 1) the greatest expression of human free will 
is moving aimlessly one’s hand at will; 2) there exists a “conscious feeling” 
to initiate a movement— which is accepted by these neuroscientists and 
philosophers without a deep multidisciplinary reflection. Therefore, the 
majority trend within neuroscience is to reduce the extreme complexity 
of the human psique to the explanatory outcome of experimental data. 
Given this, it does not come as a surprise that the two main initiatives to 
advance in the understanding of the brain exclude the human mind from 
their main interests.
Should we abandon any hope to give a holistic answer to ultimate hu-
mane questions such as the existence and limits of free will? In my opinion, 
we should not: The best strategy is to open a dialogue between disciplines 
with the aim of mutual enrichment. A good example of this dialogue is the 
conversation held by Mariano Artigas and John Eccles about the human 
soul, science and religion.
2. Interdisciplinarity: The dialogue within  
and between researchers
To the best of my knowledge, Mariano Artigas did not show a special concern 
about neuroscience in the course of his research. However, he was in contact 
with Sir John Eccles, who received the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 
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in 1963 for his work in postsynaptic inhibition (Eccles 1943). The harmony 
between their ideas is shown by the fact that Eccles wrote the prologue of 
Artigas’ Las fronteras del evolucionismo (Artigas 2004). This edition of the 
book also includes a dialogue between both professors, whose main topics 
are the human soul, science and religion (Artigas and Eccles 2004). They 
discuss the insufficiency of scientific materialism and emergentism. Eccles 
proposes that phenomena from the physical world are necessary, but not 
sufficient, causes for the self. Furthermore, he suggests a holistic point of 
view to study the human psique, since we can have access to it from “feel-
ings, emotions, the perception of beauty, creativity, love, friendship, moral 
values, thoughts, intentions… our whole world”. Finally, Eccles describes 
science as an ethical and aesthetic effort to reach truth, and he warns about 
becoming an “enormous monster, feared and venerated by humans”, if this 
description is forgotten.
The Australian neurophysiologist (1903–1997) built an extremely 
successful career by studying the communication between neurons, neu-
romuscular transmission, monosynaptic reflexes in the spinal cord, and 
inhibitory transmission in the cerebral cortex. Interestingly, he met Karl 
Popper by the end of the 1940s and was greatly impressed by his ideas about 
philosophy of science. After winning the Nobel Prize and close to retirement, 
Eccles published his first work with a philosophical nuance, The brain and 
the unity of conscious experience (Eccles 1965). Five years later, he published 
Facing reality: Philosophical adventures of a brain scientist (Eccles 1970), 
where he presents his dualist interpretation of the mind-brain problem. 
In this book, he writes the following: “As a brain scientist, I have specialist 
knowledge of that wonderful part of the body that is alone concerned in 
the whole life-long interplay between the conscious self and the external 
world, including other selves”. He tried to overcome the dualist account by 
accepting Popper’s description of three worlds as follows: 1) physical objects 
and states, including the brain; 2) states of consciousness, including the 
mind; 3) knowledge in objective sense, which involves all expressions of 
human thought. Furthermore, he calls himself an interactionist to propose 
a continuous interaction between the three worlds. However, he returned 
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to dualism in subsequent works. For example, in The wonder of being human 
(Eccles and Robinson 1984), authored together with the philosopher Daniel 
Robinson, he writes: “In conclusion we can say that it is of transcendent 
importance to recognize that by taking thought we can influence the 
operation of the neural mechanisms of the brain. In that way we can bring 
about changes in the world for good or ill. A simple metaphor is that our 
conscious self is in the driver’s seat”. In fact, in his prologue for Artigas’ 
book (Artigas 2004), he assumes “certain Cartesian vibe”.
Overall, Eccles tried to formulate and test hypotheses beyond neu-
roscience, struggling against scientific materialism. To do so, he tightly 
collaborated with philosophers such as Karl Popper or Daniel Robinson. 
Moreover, he underpinned these hypotheses by working together with 
other scientists, such as the quantum physicist Friedrich Beck. This is one 
of the pillars of interdisciplinary research: the ability to collaborate with 
researchers pertaining to other disciplines. However, in my opinion, there 
is a more important issue to carry out successfully this kind of research: to 
hold an interdisciplinary dialogue within oneself. At first sight Eccles also 
followed this path, since he was an acclaimed neurophysiologist writing 
about philosophy, ethics, quantum mechanics and so on. Nevertheless, his 
philosophical background seemed to be rather narrow by not considering 
alternatives to Cartesian dualism, and by eluding the problems it raises. 
Rather, it would have been more convenient to build a solid multidisciplinary 
background before going on a quest for holistic answers. In experimental 
research circles Eccles has been strongly criticized for his philosophical 
ideas —he considered himself as “heretic” within the “materialistic estab-
lishment” (Artigas and Eccles 2004)—, and he could have been heard more 
attentively should he had refined his philosophical position.
The last feature I would like to mention for a fruitful interdisciplinary 
research is to start at early stages of the career. Although Eccles was 
probably interested in philosophy since his youth, he only started to write 
multidisciplinary works after he turned sixty. In my opinion, Ph D students 
and postdoctoral researchers should be encouraged to transcend the limits 
of their disciplines and seek for objective truth beyond their fields. This 
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border-crossing does not only apply to experimental researchers: I believe 
that young researchers in philosophy would benefit from learning about 
empirical research and, in the case of neuroscience, the physical correlate 
of the mind.
Conclusions
After the announcement of the BRAIN Initiative and the Human Brain 
Project, it seems that the interdisciplinary dialogue between neuroscience 
and philosophy is going to become even more difficult than it is at present. 
In this context, when neuroscientists are asked about the intricacies of the 
mind, the most common point of view will be eliminativism. To struggle 
against this, it is necessary to promote an interdisciplinary dialogue, both 
between and within researchers. Sir John Eccles, collaborator with Mariano 
Artigas, is a good example of this approach. He was an excellent researcher 
in neurophysiology, awarded with the Nobel Prize, and he decided, contrary 
to the mainstream thought, that a philosophical reflection was needed 
to tackle the “hard problems” that neuroscience ultimately encounters. 
I suggest that neuroscientists and philosophers should follow his steps, and 
propose two additional ingredients to improve interdisciplinary research: 
a more solid understanding of the discipline one wants to dialogue with, 
and a multidisciplinary training from the beginning of the research career.
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